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“These original citizens were the founders of the United States.”

1

INTRODUCTION
The phrase “citizen of the United States” is used in the United
States Constitution in three different provisions—to set the qualifica2
3
4
tions for representatives, senators, and the president. If these sections—the oft-dubbed “bright-line” constitutional rules—are to have
any meaning, the United States of America, and citizenship thereof,
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DAVID RAMSAY, A DISSERTATION ON THE MANNER OF ACQUIRING THE CHARACTER
AND PRIVILEGES OF A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1789).
2
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall
be chosen.” (emphasis added)).
3
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”
(emphasis added)).
4
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to
the Office of President.” (emphasis added)).
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must have predated our Constitution. This raises two seemingly obvious yet largely unanswered questions. First, how did one constitutionally become a “citizen of the United States” prior to the ratifica5
tion of the Constitution on June 21, 1788? Second, for purposes of
citizenship, and the Constitution, when did the United States of
America begin?
The answer to the second question seems simple. The likely starting points are finite: the Declaration of Independence was signed on
July 4, 1776; the Articles of Confederation were ratified on March 1,
1781; the Treaty of Paris was signed on September 3, 1784; the delegates to the Constitutional Convention signed the Constitution on
September 17, 1787; and the Constitution was ratified on June 21,
1788. The first Congress held its initial meeting on March 4, 1789, at
Federal Hall in New York City. If a senator needed to have “been nine
Years a citizen of the United States” on March 4, 1789, the senator
would have needed to be a U.S. citizen since March 4, 1780, at the latest. This date precedes all of the other possible “starting points” except July 4, 1776. Assuming that members of the first Senate met the
6
requisite citizenship qualifications, simple arithmetic indicates that
the United States first existed as a nation when we separated from
England.
While Americans are fond of celebrating the birthday of the United States every year on July 4th, this date, as well as the Declaration,
7
has no constitutional significance. Fireworks and barbecue aside, for
legal purposes the practical starting date of the U.S. is 1789, when

5

Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2001). (“On June 21, 1788, New Hampshire became the ninth state
to ratify the Constitution. Under the plain terms of Article VII, that would seem to be
enough to bring the Constitution into effect. States that subsequently ratified the
Constitution, with or without knowledge of New Hampshire’s decisive action, were
electing to join an already existing union.”).
6
There was a prominent challenge to the qualifications of one member of the
House in 1789. See infra note 156 and accompanying text; CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS
IN CONGRESS, 1789–1834, at 23 (M. St. Clair Clarke & David A. Hall, eds. 1834) (discussing
the case of Representative William Smith).
7
See, e.g., Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 108 (1901) (quoting
Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159 (1897)) (disavowing any force
of law inherent in the Declaration but remarking that “it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence”); see also Lee
J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A Unique Role
in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 414 (2006) (arguing that the
Declaration is not legally binding).
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President Washington was inaugurated and the first Congress met.
Our courts do not take cognizance of the Declaration. Yet to a member of the first Congress or a federal judge in 1789, the United States
was not an infant, but was an old, familiar friend, and by 1789, such
congressmen and judges had no doubt considered themselves to be
U.S. citizens for quite some time.
The Constitution merely
represented a new form of government for a preexisting country. Article VII concludes that the Constitution was submitted to the states in
the year “of the Independence of the United States of America the
9
Twelfth.” The Constitution includes a direct textual and historical
10
link to the Declaration and the year 1776.
The answer to the first question of how one constitutionally became a “citizen of the United States” prior to 1789 is to be found by
studying these preceding years of Independence. While in many cases
the record and views on citizenship conflict, inevitably a single theory
emerges: our traditional view of citizenship cannot be correct. Yet
11
scholars seem to have entirely overlooked this issue.
Alexander
Bickel wrote “the concept of citizenship plays only the most minimal
role in the American constitutional scheme,” and he likely assumed
that the absence of any discussion of citizenship in the Constitution
12
indicated that this topic was intentionally disregarded. Citizenship,
although not addressed, was not ignored. Scholars were not looking
in the right places to find the answer.

8

See Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420, 422 (1820) (“Both Governments
[,under the Articles of Confederation and under the Constitution,] could not be understood to exist at the same time. The new Government did not commence until the
old Government expired. . . . In fact, Congress did continue to act as a government
until it dissolved on the first of November, by the successive disappearance of its members. It existed potentially until the 2d of March [of 1789], the day preceding that on
which the members of the new Congress were directed to assemble.”).
9
U.S. CONST. art. VII.
10
Id.
11
While no other article directly addresses this issue, the journal Constitutional
Commentary posed the question of George Washington’s citizenship as the topic of its
second annual contest, asking whether he “was in fact constitutionally eligible for the
Presidency.” Contest: Was George Washington Constitutional?, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 137,
137 (1995). This elicited only a single (and light hearted) response. See Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238 (1995) (addressing whether a citizen of Virginia prior to the ratification of the Constitution—namely George
Washington—should be considered a U.S. citizen after the ratification of the Constitution for purposes of Article II).
12
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33 (1975).

University of Pennsylvania Law Review
PENNumbra

98

[Vol. 159: 95

Part I of this Essay unites the Constitutional Trinity, from our “un13
animous Declaration,” to the “Confederation and perpetual Un14
15
ion,” to our “more perfect Union.” The continuity of the style “the
United States of America” throughout these charters reflects the permanence of the sovereignty of this republic, despite changes in the
form of governance. Throughout the early years of our union, a national community was formed—the United States of America—and in
this national community resided “citizens of the United States.”
Part II discusses the legal and theoretical doctrines of citizenship
as articulated by Lord Coke in Calvin’s Case and John Locke in his
16
Second Treatise on Government. These theories provided the jurisprudential framework that influenced citizenship in the early years of
America. Part III explores how our early republic and the states under the Continental Congress defined citizenship. Immigrants who
arrived in the United States after the creation of the Declaration received citizenship in accordance with the naturalization policies of the
states, as creating such policies was a role that the Continental Congress specifically reserved for the states. The citizenship of those who
lived in the United States before the Declaration was primarily determined under two doctrines that derived from Lockean social compact
17
theory. The first theory postulated that by virtue of residing in the
United States at the moment of independence and separation from
Great Britain, a person automatically became a citizen, regardless of
whether that person was a Yankee or a dissenting loyalist. The second
theory contended that citizenship and allegiances could not be imposed on anyone, because to do so would be contrary to the spirit of
the Declaration. Rather, following independence, a person could
18
choose or “elect” whether he wanted to become a U.S. citizen. Alternatively, he could exercise his right of expatriation within a reasonable period of time, and thereby decline citizenship. For the most
part, all states adopted a naturalization policy that mirrored one of
these strands.
13

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777.
15
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
16
See generally Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.) 396-98, (appeal taken
from Eng.) (U.K.) (distinguishing between aliens of nations at war with England and
friendly nations); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 149-50 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690) (discussing the relationship of persons with government).
17
See LOCKE at 384.
18
See infra Section III.B.
14

2010]

Original Citizenship

99

Part IV analyzes how these doctrines were applied at three critical
junctures: before the ratification of the Constitution, during the first
Congress, and following the first Congress. First, in treason cases, in
order to distinguish between a disloyal citizen and a foreign alien
combatant, a court needed to determine if the accused was a U.S. citizen. Second, because “[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elec19
tions, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,” early records
of contested elections in the House and Senate help explicate the
contours of the original understanding of U.S. citizenship for House
20
qualifications. Third, in cases interpreting Jay’s Treaty, the courts
needed to establish whether a claimant was a citizen at the time of the
Revolution in order to determine if certain barriers to recovery existed.
By fully appreciating the status of the first thirteen years of our nation, and the constitutional and legal issues our nascent government
faced, the riddle of original citizenship is unraveled.
I. THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before exploring the concept of a “citizen of the United States,”
and when such citizenship began, an antecedent question is: When
did the United States begin? Our national identity began prior to July
4, 1776. Before the Declaration, the colonists commonly referred to
21
this nation as the “United Colonies.” The so-called “olive branch petition” to King George on July 8, 1775, was signed by the “Twelve
22
United Colonies.” The Continental Congress’s commission for General Washington on June 17, 1775, was issued on behalf of the “United
23
colonies.” In Thomas Jefferson’s second draft of the Declaration on
Taking Arms, from July 6, 1775, the Continental Congress spoke on
24
behalf of the “United Colonies.” Article I of Benjamin Franklin’s
draft of the Articles of Confederation, dated July 21, 1775, styled the
25
confederacy as the “United Colonies of North America.”

19

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116.
21
DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 22
(2007) (“[I]n the months immediately before July 4, 1776, and even within the text of
the Declaration itself, the political bodies represented at the Continental Congress had
been generally called the ‘United Colonies.’” (citing Edmund C. Burnett, The Name
“United States of America,” 31 AM. HIST. REV. 79, 79-81 (1925)).
22
2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 158, 163 (1775).
23
Id. at 96.
24
Id. at 128 (1775).
25
Id. at 195 (1775).
20
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From the quill of Thomas Jefferson, the United States was born
with “[t]he unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of
26
America.” This “appears to have been . . . the first time” the phrasing
of “United States of America” was used, as “no earlier instance of its
27
use in that precise form has been found.” Through the Declaration,
the United Colonies became the United States of America. This transformation from colonies to states is memorialized in the final paragraph of the Declaration, as “these United Colonies are, and of Right
28
ought to be, Free and Independent States.” The Declaration “intro29
duced ‘the United States of America’ to the world.”
The official manuscript of the Declaration that all of the delegates
signed in July 1776—the version that now resides in the National Archives—highlighted the phrases “United States of America,” “General
Congress,” and “Free And Independent States” in a “distinctive italic
30
script that draws attention to their significance.” In the broadsides
John Dunlap printed—which constituted the first printing of the Declaration—he “highlighted [the same] three terms in its main text by
31
means of capital letters.” John Hancock sent a copy of the “Dunlap
Broadside” to General Washington on July 6, 1776, and it was then
32
read to his troops. A “contemporary report in August 1776 noted
that when the Declaration was first read out to the Continental
troops . . . ‘the language of every man’s countenance was, Now we are
33
a people! We have a name among the states of this world!’” And
34
that name was the United States of America.
Following the Declaration, the style of this country has remained,
almost consistently, the “United States of America.” A subsequent
26

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
Burnett, supra note 21, at 79. A pseudonymous letter written by “Republicus”
addressed to the people of Pennsylvania on June 26, 1776—two days before the socalled “Committee of Five” submitted the draft of the Declaration to the Continental
Congress—proclaimed “I shall rejoice to hear the title of the United States of America, in
order that we may be on a proper footing to negotiate a peace.” 6 AMERICAN ARCHIVES
1131 (Peter Force, ed. 4th-5th ser., 1846).
28
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
29
ARMITAGE, supra note 21, at 21-22.
30
Id. at 22.
31
Id.
32
Declaring Independence:
Drafting the Document, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/declara/declara4.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
33
ARMITAGE, supra note 21, at 17-18.
34
See also id. at 22 (“That is what the Declaration of Independence declared: that
the former United Colonies were now ‘the United States of America’ because they
were ‘free and independent states.’”).
27
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draft of the Articles of Confederation, dated July 12, 1776, changed
the style of the confederacy from the previous “United Colonies of
35
North America” to the “The United States of America.” The Plan of
Treaties with France, dated September 17, 1776, refers repeatedly to
36
the “United States.” The Articles of War, dated September 20, 1776,
37
refers to the “armies of the United States.” Congress briefly adopted
the style of the “United States of North America” in its treaty with
38
France, dated May 19, 1778. However, on July 11, 1778, Congress
39
“resolved to drop the word ‘North’ from the title.”
Under the Articles of Confederation, agreed upon by Congress on
November 15, 1777, the name of our nation remained constant. The
preamble of the Articles declares that “the Delegates of the United
States of America in Congress assembled did . . . in the Second Year of the
40
Independence of America . . . agree to certain articles of Confederation.”
Thus stressing the continuity of the government, the Articles specifically hold that the government was in fact continuing in its second year
since the Declaration. This mirrors the English practice of measuring
the length of a monarch’s reign by counting the number of years
since her coronation. When ratified on March 1, 1781, Article I of the
Articles of Confederation provided that the “[s]tile [sic] of this confe41
deracy shall be ‘The United States of America.’” The name of this country was not limited to domestic recognition; it was also recognized by
the international community—including England, which had previously refused to acknowledge the new name. On September 3, 1783,
John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay affixed their signatures
to the Treaty of Paris between “his Britannic Majesty and the United
42
States of America.”
The Constitution continued this style. On September 17, 1787, its
preamble boldly proclaimed that “[w]e the people of the United
States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
43
44
of America.” The goal to “form a more perfect Union” presupposes
35

5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 546 (1776).
Id. at 769.
37
Id. at 788.
38
Treaty of Alliance, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 6.
39
Burnett, supra note 21, at 81.
40
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 pmbl. (emphasis added).
41
Id. art. I (emphasis added).
42
Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and His Britannic Majesty, U.S.-Gr. Brit.., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80 (emphasis added).
43
U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added); see also, Steiker et al, supra note 11, at 240
(“[The preamble] suggests that the‘United States’ preceded the particular political
structure established by the new Constitution.”).
36
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the existence of a less perfect union—namely the “perpetual Union”
45
under the Articles of Confederation. Consistent with the date referred to in Preamble to the Articles of Confederation, Article VII of
the Constitution concludes that the Constitution was submitted to the
states in the year “of the independence of the United States of Ameri46
ca the Twelfth.”
Article VI of the Constitution speaks further to this continuity.
Clause I provides that “all Debts contracted and Engagements entered
into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the
47
United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.”
While the United States was previously governed “under the Confederation,” it would now be governed “under this Constitution,” and
48
prior debts are valid. Similarly, the Supremacy Clause provides that
“all Treaties made” under the previous form of government, and
those treaties which “shall be made [in the future fall] under the Au49
thority of the United States.” The constitution considers both types
of treaties the “supreme Law of the Land.” The Treaty of Paris, signed
on September 3, 1784, as well as other treaties enacted prior to the ratification of the Constitution, remained valid.
50
“What’s in a name?” In the case of the United States, 236 years
of independence and unity as a nation. The U.S., as a sovereign, has
been in continuous existence since 1776. The Declaration simply
provides another link in our constitutional chain that stretches from
1776 to the second year of our independence (when the Articles of
Confederation were proposed), and to the twelfth year of our independence (when the Constitution was proposed). All of these charters are connected and interrelated. The Declaration, the Articles of
44

U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936)
(“The Union existed before the Constitution . . . . Prior to that event, it is clear that the
Union, declared by the Articles of Confederation to be perpetual, was the sole possessor of external sovereignty and in the Union it remained without change save in so far
as the Constitution in express terms qualified its exercise.”).
46
U.S. CONST. art. VII. Abraham Lincoln began the Gettysburg Address by counting back “[f]our score and seven years ago” from 1863, which was 1776. See Abraham
Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
47
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
48
See Steiker et al., supra note 11, at 241 (“It is hard to argue that such debts could
have been created unless there was a ‘United States’ prior to the United States ‘under
this [particular] Constitution’ to create them.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 1)).
49
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
50
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
45
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Confederation, and the Constitution represent three modes of government for one sovereign—our Constitutional Trinity. While the form
has changed, the “United States of America,” and the citizens of the
United States, have remained.
II. THEORIES OF CITIZENSHIP
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Lord Coke’s
seminal opinion in Calvin’s Case provided the definitive statement of
how one became a subject of the King of England. The case held that
a person’s birthright subjectship was immutable, perpetual, and could
51
not be abandoned.
Rejecting this theory, the American colonists
turned to the social compact theory of John Locke and the doctrine of
volitional allegiance to provide an intellectual and philosophical sup52
port for their separation with England. The American Revolution
effected a radical change not only in the forms of government, but also in the legal doctrines that justified those governments.
A. Cokean Perpetual Allegiance
Calvin’s Case, also known as the Case of the Postnati, was a test case
to determine the subjectship of the Scots resulting from the union of
Scotland and England following the coronation of James I, who was
53
already James VI of Scotland. In this case, Robert Calvin, a postnati—
an infant born after the ascension—was prevented from taking possession of land to which he was lawfully entitled because he was deemed
54
55
to be an alien, and therefore could not inherit land in England.
Lord Coke, the chief justice of the Court of Common Pleas, wrote
56
what became the “definitive statement of the law.” In a lengthy and
somewhat confusing opinion, Coke found that the allegiance a person
acquires at birth to the sovereign is natural and immutable, and cannot be relinquished or abandoned. A subject born under the protection of the sovereign would remain a subject, even if the sovereign no
longer provided any protection. The right of expatriation—that is the
right to flee the jurisdiction and abjure one’s loyalty—did not exist

51

Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 409.
See LOCKE, supra note 16, at 149-50.
53
Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 377.
54
Id. at 409.
55
Id. at 399.
56
JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, at
17 (1978).
52
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57

because subjectship could never be vitiated.
The antenati—those
born before their territory was lost, in this case, the Scottish—would
be bound by an allegiance to both the original sovereign and the con58
quering power. Because allegiance was perpetual, subjectship to the
original sovereign could never be eliminated. When England conquered Scotland, a subject’s initial allegiance to Scotland remained,
and a new allegiance became due to the conquering English. Flowing
from this perpetual allegiance, Coke reasoned that loyalty need not
correspond to the current state of politics, but rather derived from the
59
natural obligations between a subject and whomever wore the crown.
B. Lockean Social Contract Theory
Following the Glorious Revolution, the English Constitution was
fundamentally changed. The power of the monarchy was severely limited, while the supremacy of Parliament emerged. The “[d]octrines
of consent and parliamentary sovereignty . . . eroded” the holdings of
60
Calvin’s Case. This political upheaval corresponded with a “major in61
tellectual revolution” embodied in the theories of John Locke.
Locke rejected Coke’s notion that allegiance resulted from the
inherent sovereignty of the King and contended that individuals and
society joined together voluntarily to form social compacts and com62
munities. Locke also disagreed with Coke regarding expatriation. If
an individual could consent to the rule of a sovereign, that person, or
even the society as a whole, could also expatriate and withdraw that
57

Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 409. Based on this theory, even after Jay’s Treaty,
British ships continued to impress Americans captured at sea, claiming that naturalized citizens born in England were still subjects of the Crown. These events eventually
culminated in the War of 1812. See Charles Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of
Congress to Expatriate American Citizens, 53 GEO. L.J. 315, 318-19 (1965) (“The executive
branch of our Government was confronted with realities rather than theories in the
disputes which led to the War of 1812. The British Government, claiming that the allegiance of its subjects was indelible, was boarding American ships to impress into military service American seamen.”).
58
Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 398.
59
Id. at 382.
60
Id. at 52.
61
Id. at 44.
62
See LOCKE, supra note 16, at 197 (“The reason why men enter into society is the
preservation of their property; and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative,
is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of
all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of
every part and member of the society.”); see also KETTNER, supra note 56, at 44 (“[P]art
of [peoples’] natural independence was relinquished in order to protect their most
essential liberties.”).
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63

consent. Locke’s consent-based theory clashed with Coke’s views of
immutable subjectship.
While Lockean doctrines “were at least superficially integrated,”
social compact theory had only a minimal impact on the practical ap64
plication of the law of subjectship in England. Most British courts
65
continued to rely on Calvin’s Case. However, in the American colonies, the “consensual and contractual elements implicit in naturalization and in the new political theories of the later seventeenth century
would slowly emerge to dominate ideas of subjectship and alle66
giance.” The colonists turned to the Lockean view of the contractual
basis of society in which allegiance was tied to protection.
James Wilson wrote “[a]llegiance to the king and obedience to the
parliament are founded on very different principles. The former is
67
founded on protection: the latter, on representation.” Similarly, Alexander Hamilton noted that the connection with Great Britain and the
colonies was formed “by the ties of blood, interest, and mutual protection,” and “[w]hen . . . lives and properties are at stake, it would be
foolish and unnatural to refrain from such measures as might preserve
68
them.” Under this view, the colonies would not necessarily be bound
by the acts of Parliament unless they so consented. Locke described
this reciprocal relationship in terms of a trust, and noted that “governments are dissolved” when the “[t]he legislative acts against the
69
trust reposed in them.”
John Adams observed that unlike the case in Ireland, Parliament’s
authority to rule the colonies was not “founded on the consent and

63

See LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194 (“[I]t is in their legislative, that the members of
a commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living body.
This is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to the commonwealth . . . when the legislative is broken or dissolved, dissolution and death follows.”); see also KETTNER, supra
note 56, at 54 (arguing that Locke’s position might be interpreted to allow a termination of one’s obligation to the sovereign).
64
See id. at 45, 52 (noting that in the nineteenth century, citation to Coke’s reports was “virtually mandatory[,]” thereby limiting competing theories of citizenship).
65
Id. at 45.
66
Id. at 60. The colonists thought of allegiance “as a contractual, quid pro quo
relationship in which the privileges of membership could be claimed as a right by the
person who chose to contribute his efforts and talents to the welfare of the community.” Id. at 107.
67
JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of
the British Parliament, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 721, 736-37 (Robert Green
McCloskey ed., 1967).
68
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress, etc., in ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS 10, 16 (Library of America 2001).
69
LOCKE, supra note 16, at 197.
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70

compact” of the Americans. Allegiance to the king was earned in reciprocity for protection. James Wilson noted that “the duties of the
king and those of the subject are plainly reciprocal: they can be vi71
olated on neither side, unless they be performed on the other.” Recognizing this reciprocal duty, one of the grievances against the king
in the Declaration was that “[h]e . . . abdicated Government, by declaring [the colonists] out of his Protection and waging War against
72
[them].” In the words of Locke, “[w]here there is no longer the
administration of justice, for the securing of men’s rights . . . there
73
certainly is no government left.”
This notion formed the legal predicate of the Declaration.
Locke’s “theory was beautifully adapted for those who wished to legitimize alterations and revolutions in government”—including the
Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution—”without sanctioning as a necessary first step the obliteration of all authority and all
74
obligation.” Locke distinguished “between the dissolution of the so75
ciety, and the dissolution of the government.” “Whenever the society
is dissolved, it is certain the government of that society cannot re-

70

NOVANGLUS [JOHN ADAMS], Addressed to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay April 3, 1775, in NOVANGLUS AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS, OR, POLITICAL ESSAYS,
at 118, 118 (Hews & Goss 1819).
71
JAMES WILSON, Speech Delivered in the Convention for the Province of Pennsylvania
(Jan. 1775), in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 67, at 747, 753-54.
72
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); see also, PA. CONST. of 1776
reprinted in 5 AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIC LAWS 3081,
3081(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (“And whereas the inhabitants of this commonwealth have in consideration of protection only, heretofore acknowledged allegiance to the king of Great Britain; and the said king has not only withdrawn that protection, but commenced, and still continues to carry on, with unabated vengeance, a
most cruel and unjust war against them . . . all allegiance . . . to the said king . . . are
dissolved.”).
73
LOCKE, supra note 16, at 219. Locke also wrote that government may be dissolved “[w]hen he who has the supreme executive power, neglects and abandons that
charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution. This is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy. ”). Id.
74
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 144; see also LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194 (“Besides
this overturning from without, governments are dissolved from within. First, [w]hen
the legislative is altered. . . . When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make
laws, whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws without authority,
which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to
be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new legislative, as they think
best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without authority would impose any thing upon them.”).
75
LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194.
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76

main.” Following the dissolution of society, “men returned to the
77
state of nature, and all political obligation ceased.”
In contrast, “[t]he world is too well instructed in, and too forward
to allow of, this [reversion to the state of nature following the] dissolv78
ing of governments.” When there is a dissolution of government,
people do not need to return to the state of nature, and in fact political obligations could continue, though loyalties would be transferred
79
to the new sovereign. Returning to the state of nature does “not
[occur] upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all
the slips of human frailty, will be born by the people without mutiny
80
Or, as Jefferson phrased it in the Declaration,
or murmur.”
“[p]rudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established
81
should not be changed for light and transient Causes.”
One could characterize the transition from rule under King
George III to rule under the Declaration as a Lockean dissolution of
society. The previous colonial structure, along with all attendant political obligations and allegiances to it, ceased. Through this social
compact, a new society was formed. On May 10, 1776, the remnants
of the Virginia House of Burgesses, speaking through the presidency
of Edmund Pendleton, agreed that the king’s actions had caused a
82
dissolution of their society “in the Lockean sense.” With this dissolution, all prior allegiances were nullified: “It being their opinion, that
the people could not now be legally represented according to the ancient constitution, which has been subverted by the king, lords, and
commons of Great Britain, and consequently dissolved, they unanim83
ously dissolved themselves accordingly.” In Bayard v. Singleton, the
North Carolina Supreme Court wrote that the Revolutionary War had
created a state of nature in which the former subjects of the Crown
were in “a similar situation with a set of people ship-wrecked and cast

76

Id.
See KETTNER, supra note 56, at 53 (discussing Lockean views of allegiance).
78
LOCKE, supra note 16, at 193-94.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 199.
81
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
82
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 168.
83
VIRGINIA
GAZETTE,
May
10,
1776,
available
at
http://research.history.org/DigitalLibrary/VirginiaGazette/VGImagePopup.cfm?ID=5
562&Res=HI; see also KETTNER, supra note 56, at 168 (making note of the reaction of
the remaining Virginia House of Burgesses).
77
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on a maroon’d island—without laws, without magistrates, without
84
government, or any legal authority.”
In contrast, the evolution from the Declaration to the Articles of
Confederation to the Constitution marks dissolutions of government.
While the Declaration abjured all allegiances to Britain, this tripartite
transformation maintained allegiances to the government of the
United States, albeit in a different form. “As long as government continued to operate legitimately, protecting life, liberty, and property,
85
individual subjects were bound.” Citizenship and allegiances did not
change as the form of government evolved. A citizen under the Declaration became a citizen under the Articles, and then became a citi86
zen under the Constitution. The amendment process, as articulated in
Article V of the Constitution, permits future generations to add additional links to our constitutional chain. Rather than effecting a dissolution of
government in the Lockean sense—whereby a new charter of government is established—the Constitution, through the consent of the ratification conventions, permits the efficacious evolution of government.
III. CITIZENSHIP FOLLOWING THE REVOLUTION
Locke’s contract theory was aptly suited to explain how those who
accepted the sovereignty of the Continental Congress became citizens:
they willingly entered into a compact. But what happened to the citizenship of the loyalist dissenters? In this sense, “Locke’s theoretical
scheme was thus ill equipped to deal with the difficult problems of
87
choice raised by the American Revolution.” Two doctrines emerged
to explain citizenship for the antenati. The first was premised on the
state’s imposing citizenship—regardless of the person’s willingness—
and the second was based on the granting of citizenship to those who
so elected.
A. Imposing Citizenship Following Independence
The first doctrine postulated that when the majority chose to declare independence, everyone was required to submit to the newly ordained-and-established government, because the United States was the

84
85
86
87

1 N.C. (Mart.) 42, 43 (1787).
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 143-44.
See infra Part IV.
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 190.
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88

proper successor to the Crown. In Ainslie v. Martin, Chief Justice
Parsons of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted this ra89
tionale. At issue in this case was the citizenship of an infant born in
Massachusetts in 1774, who left prior to the Declaration, and never re90
turned. The Court held that the Declaration resulted in an automatic transfer of allegiance. Parsons found that “all persons born within
the territories of the government and people, although before the
declaration of independence, were born within the allegiance of the
same government and people, as the successor of the former sove91
reign, who had abdicated his throne.” The American government
served “as [the King’s] successor, [and therefore] the same government and people [] succeeded to all the crown lands within the terri92
tory, as lawfully appertaining to them.” Accordingly, “all persons,
born within the territories of the province of Massachusetts Bay during the reign of the late king, are considered as born within the allegiance of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, as his lawful succes88

Id. at 190-92. The Court in Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrator shared the view
that U.S. citizenship was imposed upon colonists once the majority declared independence, noting that
[i]f it be asked, in whom, during our revolution [sic] war, was lodged, and by
whom was exercised this supreme authority [referring to the powers of “war
and peace”]? No one will hesitate for an answer. It was lodged in, and exercised by, Congress; it was there, or no where; the states individually did not,
and, with safety, could not exercise it . . . As to war and peace, and their necessary incidents, Congress, by the unanimous voice of the people, exercised exclusive jurisdiction, and stood, like Jove, amidst the deities of old, paramount,
and supreme.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 80-81 (1795); see also LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194 (“[T]he essence
and union of the society consisting in having one will, the legislative, when once established by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that will.”).
89
See 9 Mass. (1 Tyng) 454, 458 (1813) (“Thus the government became a republick, possessing all the rights vested in the former sovereign; among which was the
right to the allegiance of all persons born within the territory of the province of Massachusetts Bay.”).
90
Id. at 455.
91
Id. at 459.
92
Id.; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17
(1936) (“Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government change; but
sovereignty survives. A political society cannot endure without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the
Union.” (citing Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 80-81)); LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194
(“The constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society, whereby
provision is made for the continuation of their union, under the direction of persons,
and bonds of laws, made by persons authorized thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the people; without which no one man, or number of men, amongst
them, can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest.”).
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93

sor.” In this sense, the establishment of a new republic was intertwined with the instantiation of a new political character—a citizen of
the United States. In the words of David Ramsay (a member of the
second Continental Congress) following the separation with England,
Americans present during the Declaration “became coequal citizens, and,
94
collectively, assumed all the rights of sovereignty.” Those who were
“parties to this solemn act” became citizens and “were the founders of the
95
United States.”
A different strand of citizenship doctrine resembled a hybrid of
Lockean and Cokean theories. People could become citizens either
96
Locke’s social contract
through consent or through conquest.
theory accounted for those persons who voluntarily accepted the new
government, while the doctrine of conquest from Calvin’s Case—
whereby those conquered owed obedience to the conquerors even if
97
they dissented from their rule—accounted for loyalist dissenters.
98
In Read v. Read, the Virginia Supreme Court adopted this theory
and noted that “loyalists became citizens—albeit unwilling—not because of their birth or residence in America, but because they had
99
been conquered.” Those who refused to assent to the new govern100
ment were “legitimated . . . by virtue of the implied compact only.”
This holding evinces glimpses of Calvin’s Case, viewing citizenship as
perpetual and subject to change only in form. In the same sense that
an antenatus of Scotland obtained a new allegiance to England following the conquest, an antenatus of the colony of Virginia obtained new
citizenship to the Commonwealth of Virginia under the authority and
auspices of the Declaration and the Continental Congress. Combining both of these theories, the majority could consent to the new government while the dissenting loyalists had citizenship imposed on them,

93

Ainslie, 9 Mass. (1 Tyng) at 459 (emphasis omitted).
RAMSAY, supra note 1, at 4. This “anti-Smith tract” was prepared to challenge the
qualifications of William Smith in the House of Representatives. See 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1788-1790, at 195 n.2 (Merrill Jensen
& Robert A. Becker eds., 1976). The reliability of Ramsay’s dissertation as a historical
document, rather than as a political broadside, is suspect.
95
RAMSAY, supra note 1, at 5.
96
See KETTNER, supra note 56, at 192.
97
Id .
98
9 Va. (5 Call) 160, 201 (1804).
99
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 192.
100
Id.
94
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101

often against their will.
This holding sounds in Coke, though it is in
tension with Lockean theory.
B. Citizenship by Election
The doctrine of citizenship through imposition—which essentially
coerced a loyalist dissenter to assume a new allegiance—presented
theoretical difficulties for Americans. These doctrines conflicted with
the spirit of the Declaration, which was predicated on consent to a social compact. If Americans were not willing to swear allegiance to King
George III against their will, then they should not have considered their
allegiance to a new American sovereign sworn without their consent. As
Locke phrased it, “[w]hen any one, or more, shall take upon them to
make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws
102
without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey.”
In response to the shortcoming in both of these theories, the
103
The premise
states developed a “doctrine of the right of election.”
was simple: “Citizenship in the new republics was to begin with indi104
vidual consent.” Ramsay wrote that “[c]itizenship, acquired by tacit
consent, is exclusively confined to the cases of persons who have resided within the United States since the declaration of indepen105
dence.” The binding choice of loyalty had to be made within a certain
period of time. As articulated by William Tilghman, who argued on behalf of the petitioner in M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee “[i]n revolutions, every
man has a right to take his part. He is excusable, if not bound in duty to
106
take that part which in his conscience he approves.”
During the “period of governmental disorganization, accompanying independence . . . . individuals had some time to consider their
107
An election of loyalty occurred, “explicitly,
choice of allegiance.”
when they acknowledged the legitimacy of the new states or, implicitly, when they accepted the protection of the new constitutions and
101

Of course, only a small percentage of the populace expressly offered consent
to adopt this new government. Further, it is quite tragic and slightly ironic that while
most slaves, native Indians, and women could not become citizens, certain loyalists
were essentially conscripted into citizenship. Nevertheless, these doctrines laid the intellectual and philosophical groundwork for the extension of citizenship and equality
to all in theory, if not in practice. Tragically, the promise of citizenship for all people
was not realized until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
102
LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194.
103
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 193.
104
Id. at 194.
105
RAMSAY, supra note 1, at 7-8 (emphasis omitted).
106
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 281 (1805).
107
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 194.
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108

laws.”
The length of the period of election depended “upon when
109
legitimate, protective laws came into being in the respective states.”
“Americans acknowledged the right of the state to dictate the timing
of election” while only the individual “would be responsible for mak110
ing the choice between subjectship and citizenship.”
If a person
chose not to exercise election, he could exercise the complementary
right of expatriation by departing the United States and swearing allegiances to another sovereign. Following the Revolution, “most Ameri111
cans necessarily accepted the right of expatriation.” Once the election was made and acknowledged by the state, with certain exceptions,
112
a citizen generally could not change his status. Following the Revo113
lution, most states started to adopt the election doctrine.
IV. CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES
In the wake of the Declaration, citizenship of the United States, a
previously unrecognized political construct, was born. While in the
114
past “subjectship” defined one’s allegiance to the king, “[t]he status
115
In the
of ‘American citizen’ was the creation of the Revolution.”
words of Ramsay, Americans had, following the Revolution, “changed
116
from subjects to citizens” and the “difference [was] immense.” Citizenship, in contrast with Cokean subjectship, was not based on perpetual allegiance, but rather flowed from individual consent. This new
status was created to “govern membership in a free society: republican citizenship ought to rest on consent; it ought to be uniform and
117
without invidious gradations; and it ought to confer equal rights.”
This Part considers how this citizenship was understood at three
distinct points in our early history. First, in treason cases, the court
108

Id.
Id.
110
Id. at 208.
111
GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 248 (2009).
112
See Shanks v. DuPont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 247 (1830) (noting that the Treaty
of Paris “took the actual state of things as its basis” for purposes of election so that “all
those . . . who then adhered to the American states, were virtually absolved from all
allegiance to the British crown”).
113
See KETTNER, supra note 56, at 194 (“Citizenship in the new republics was to begin with individual consent.”).
114
Id. at 187 (“Citizenship supplanted subjectship as the source of protection
shifted from George III to the independent states.”).
115
Id. at 208.
116
RAMSAY, supra note 1, at 3.
117
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 10.
109
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needed to determine whether the accused was a foreign alien levying
war against the United States, or a disloyal citizen engaged in sedition.
Central to this decision was the application of a concept of citizenship
to the status of the defendant. Second, while the Constitutional Convention largely ignored issues of citizenship, members of the first
Congress shed light on this issue in challenges to the qualifications of
an elected representative. Third, in adjudications of Jay’s Treaty,
courts needed to ascertain whether claimants of property and damages were U.S. citizens, both at the time of the Revolution and prior to
the Treaty of Paris. Each of these historical epochs reflects a consistent application of the doctrine of citizenship through election.
A. Treason Prosecutions
The first Articles of War, enacted by the Continental Congress on
June 30, 1775, provided for punishment for treason by those under
118
the authority of the Continental Army.
The question of allegiance
was an initial inquiry in any treason prosecution, as “[t]reason indictments necessarily included a statement that the accused in fact owed
119
allegiance to the state.”
A person deemed to be a subject of England could wage war against America, and could not be found guilty
of treason, for his loyalty lay with the crown. In contrast, a disloyal citizen of the United States could be prosecuted for treason, for his
loyalty was to the United States. The treason statute, broadly construed, applied to “[a]nyone, alien or citizen, permanent resident or
120
visitor, who enjoyed the protection of the government.”
The leading treason case is Respublica v. Chapman, a Pennsylvania
121
Supreme Court case decided by Chief Justice M’Kean in 1781.
Samuel Chapman was born in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, and on De-

118

See BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON 29-30 (1964) (explaining
that people could be punished for, among other offenses, mutiny, sedition, providing
supplies to the enemy, and harboring an enemy).
119
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 181.
120
CHAPIN, supra note 118, at 71.
121
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53 (Pa. 1781). Chapman was selected for inclusion in the U.S.
Reports even though it was decided seven years before the Constitutional Convention,
and the case has been cited in numerous Supreme Court opinions. See Eugene Volokh,
Little-Known Weird Legal Fact Leads to Glitch in Court of Appeals Opinion, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (May 8, 2006, 1:27 pm), http://volokh.com/2006/05/08/little-knownweird-legal-fact-leads-to-glitch-in-court-of-appeals-opinion (“Volume 1 of U.S. Reports is
occupied entirely by cases from Pennsylvania . . . [because] Alexander Dallas, the entrepreneur who published the cases, included the other courts’ cases to make the volumes [of Supreme Court cases] more salable, since the U.S. Supreme Court produced
relatively few cases in its early years.”).
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cember 26, 1776, following what must have been an eventful Christ122
mas, he “departed and joined the enemy.” In a proclamation dated
June 15, 1778, the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania or123
dered the “attainder of divers traitors.”
The resolution of this case hinged on whether Chapman was ever
a U.S. citizen. If he was, the attainder was valid, and he would be considered a traitor. If not, and he remained a British citizen, the attainder was ineffective. In that situation, Chapman could be punished
as a foreign enemy but he could not be considered a traitor. The attorney general alleged that Chapman was “an inhabitant and subject
124
of” Pennsylvania, and thus a traitor. Chapman replied that he was a
“subject of the king of Great Britain” and had never “been a subject or
125
inhabitant of” Pennsylvania.
Chapman’s counsel argued that “on the 26th December, 1776,
there was no government established in Pennsylvania, from which
[Chapman] could receive protection; and consequently, there was
none to which he could owe allegiance—protection and allegiance be126
ing political obligations of a reciprocal nature.” In Chapman’s view,
because no government existed when he fled Pennsylvania, he could
not have received any protection and thus owed no loyalty to the state.
The attorney general countered that “[b]y the declaration of independence, on the 4th July, 1776, every State in the union was solemnly
declared to be free and independent,” and on “the 26th day of December, 1776 . . . [Chapman] was certainly a subject of the state of
Pennsylvania, under the constitution agreed to on the 28th day of
127
September preceding.” This argument—that Chapman became a citizen as a result of the majority’s consenting consenting to the new union—mirrored the position taken by the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas128
sachusetts in Ainslie v. Martin.
Chief Justice M’Kean sought to
determine whether Chapman “was to be considered as an inhabitant and
subject of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, at the time of his depar129
ture.”

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 53.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 54, 55.
9 Mass. (1 Tyng) 454 (1813).
Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 53.
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M’Kean found that even though an official constitution had not
been established, “a formal compact is not a necessary foundation of
government; for, if an individual had assumed the sovereignty, and
the people had assented to it, whatever limitations might afterwards
have been imposed, still this would have been a legal establish130
ment.” M’Kean continued:
Locke says, that when the Executive is totally dissolved, there can be no
treason; for laws are a mere nullity; unless there is a power to execute
them. But that is not the case at present . . . for before the meeting of
Council in March, 1777, all its members were chosen, and the legislature
was completely organized: so that there did antecedently exist a power
competent to redress grievances, to afford protection, and, generally, to
execute the laws; and allegiance being naturally due to such a power, we
are of opinion, that from the moment it was created, the crime of High
Treason might have been committed by any person, who was then a sub131
ject of the Commonwealth.

The Court found that Chapman owed allegiance from the date
132
that the legislature had convened. Despite the fact that following a
civil war “the voice of the majority must be conclusive, . . . the minority
have, individually, an unrestrainable right to remove with their property into another country . . . and, in short, that none are subjects of
133
the adopted government, who have not freely assented to it.”
This
represented the period of election. Chapman exercised his right of
election, and expatriated from Pennsylvania a month before the first
statute had been passed under the new Constitution, and three
months prior to the point where all three branches of the government
were in operation.
Cognizant of the climate in which he judged—the Revolution was
still raging throughout the colonies—Chief Justice M’Kean noted that
[t]his construction, it may be said, is favorable to traitors, and tends to
prejudice of the Commonwealth. But we cannot be influenced by observations of a political nature in the exposition of the law; it is our duty to
seek for, and to declare, the true intention of the Legislature; the policy
134
of that intention, it is their duty to consider.

130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 56.
Id. at 57 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
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Still, M’Kean charged, “[i]t is better to err on the side of mercy, than
135
of strict justice.” With this charge favorable to the accused, the jury
136
acquitted Chapman.
Citizenship by election emerged as the dominant view in later
court decisions. In North Carolina, following the Declaration, people
had an inherent right to elect their choice of citizenship resulting
137
from the state of nature formed by the Revolution. North Carolina
solemnized this election in an act passed in April of 1777, offering all
residents “the option of taking an oath of allegiance, or of departing
138
the state.”
The New York Supreme Court later adopted a similar
view in Jackson v. White, holding that “[e]very member of the old government must have the right to decide for himself, whether he will
continue with a society which has so fundamentally changed its condi139
tion.”
Ultimately, this view was adopted by the United States Su140
preme Court in M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee.
B. Citizenship of the United States as Determined by State Law
While the Constitutional Convention featured spirited discussion
about how long a person needed to be a U.S. citizen in order to serve
in Congress, there was sparse debate over how citizenship should be
defined. On August 13, 1787, Gouverneur Morris “moved to add to
the end of the section [governing the citizenship qualifications] a
proviso that the limitation of seven years should not affect the rights
141
of any person now a Citizen.” This motion essentially sought to credit determinations of state citizenship when considering U.S. citizenship. In other words, if a person was a citizen under state law, the requirements of being a citizen of the United States for seven years in
order to qualify for Congress need not apply.

135

Id. at 60.
Id.
137
See Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5, 8 (1787) (recognizing a landowner’s
decision pursuant to an act of the legislature to return to Great Britain and thereby
remain a British subject).
138
Hamilton v. Eaton, 11 F. Cas. 336, 339 (Cir. Ct. D.N.C. 1792)(No. 5,980)
(Ellsworth, J.); see also RAMSAY, supra note 1, at 5 (“Those who refused [to take oaths]
were ordered to depart, as being patrons unfriendly to the revolution.”).
139
20 Johns. 313, 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
140
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 284 (1805) (“When the Revolution was proposed, he
had a right to chuse [sic] his side.”).
141
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
439 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1840).
136
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John Mercer of Maryland seconded this motion, noting that “[i]t
was necessary . . . to prevent a disfranchisement of persons who had
become Citizens under and on the faith & according to the laws &
142
Constitution from being on a level in all respects with natives.”
Mercer was referring to citizenship granted by state constitutions under the Declaration and later the Articles of Confederation. James
Wilson, himself an immigrant, “who was instrumental in framing the
Constitution and who served as one of the original Members of [the
143
Supreme] Court,” sided with Morris and Mercer. Wilson noted that
the Pennsylvania Constitution gave “to foreigners after two years residence all the rights whatsoever of citizens,” and the Articles of Confe144
deration made “the Citizens of one State Citizens of all.”
From
these laws, Wilson argued that Pennsylvania was obligated to “main145
tain the faith thus pledged to her citizens of foreign birth.”
Roger Sherman disagreed with Morris, Mercer, and Wilson, arguing that “[t]he U[nited] States have not invited foreigners nor
pledged their faith that they should enjoy equal privileges with native
146
Though the
Citizens. The Individual States alone have done this.”
states had granted citizenship, Sherman argued that the United States
need not recognize this citizenship.
Madison criticized Sherman’s contention and asserted that the
delegates are the “Agents” of the states that “appoint[ed] this Conven147
Madison further explained
tion,” and will “ratify its proceedings.”
that “[i]f the new Constitution then violates the faith pledged” to any
naturalized citizens, “the States [would] be the violators” of the Con148
stitution.
The United States should thus respect the naturalization
and citizenship decisions of the states. Wilson also read the Comity
Clause of the Articles of Confederation and “inferred the obligation
Pen[nsylvania] was under to maintain the faith thus pledged to her
149
citizens of foreign birth.”
Likewise, Mercer agreed that the United
150
States should not begin its existence by a “breach of faith.”

142

Id.
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 10 (1994).
144
MADISON, supra note 141, at 441; see also PA. CONST. of 1776 § 42 (“Every foreigner of good character who comes to settle in this state . . . shall not be capable of
being elected a representative until after two years residence.”).
145
MADISON, supra note 141, at 441.
146
Id. at 440.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 441.
150
Id.
143
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Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina disagreed with Madison, and
“remarked that the laws of the States had varied much the terms of
naturalization in different parts of America; and contended that the
151
United States could not be bound to respect them.” In other words,
he argued that the United States need not give credence to the naturalization laws of the states.
The Convention voted down Morris’s provision by a vote of six to
five, with Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia voting “aye,” and New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware,
152
While
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia voting “no.”
the delegates to the Convention defeated this provision by a close
vote, the first Congress expressly repudiated it. Only two years later
153
during its vital term, based on the arguments on James Madison, the
first Congress adopted the position that pledges made by the states
prior to the ratification of the Constitution determine qualifications
154
for the House.
In the first congressional election, the American people elected
nine representatives and senators who were not born in the United
155
States, four of whom had signed the Constitution in Philadelphia.
Yet it was the election of William Smith, who was born in South Carolina but grew up in Europe, which resulted in the first constitutional challenge in the House of Representatives under the Qualifications Clause of
156
Article I.
Smith was born in South Carolina to a family that traced its lineage to the first settlers of the colony. In 1774, he left for Geneva to
157
pursue an education, and stayed there until 1778. He later traveled
151

Id.
Id. at 442. Rhode Island was not represented at the Constitutional Convention,
and New York did not cast a vote on this issue.
153
James Madison told Thomas Jefferson that the First Congress was “in a wilderness without a single footstep to guide us. Our successors will have an easier task.”
WOOD, supra note 111, at 55 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS (Merrill Jenson & Robert A. Becker eds., 1976)).
154
See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First
Congress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 861 (1994) (noting Madison’s leadership
on this issue) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 420-23 (Joseph Gates ed., 1834)).
155
See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, U.S. CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2010)
(providing a directory in which one can enter names of relevant congressmen—in this
case Burke, Butler, Fitzsimons, Jackson, Johnston, Laurence, Morris, Paterson, and
Tucker—to access their biographies).
156
CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, 1789-1834, supra note 6, at 23.
157
Id. at 26.
152
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to Paris—where he “resided two months as an American gentleman
[and] was received in that character by Dr. Franklin [and] Mr.
158
Adams”—and London, where he studied law. He returned to the U.S.
in 1783, and upon “his arrival at Charleston, he was received by his coun159
trymen as a citizen of the State of South Carolina.” Smith was elected
160
as a member of the State Legislature and Privy Council. After his election to the House in 1788, his seat was contested on the grounds that he
161
had not yet been “seven year a citizen of the United States.”
In September 1779, the South Carolina Legislature determined
that it was in “the interest of the State that [young men who were sent
abroad for their education] should be allowed to continue in Europe
162
The legislature also detertill they were twenty-two years of age.”
mined that a double tax should be imposed upon those young men
who chose not to return, but expressly preserved their citizenship
163
rights. Because Smith
was admitted to offices of trust, to which aliens were not admissible, and
as he was admitted to them without having the rights of citizenship conferred upon him, in pursuance of [the 1784 naturalization] act, it followed clearly that the people of South Carolina and the Legislature ac164
knowledged him to be a citizen by virtue of the revolution.

Smith argued that his guardians in South Carolina who represented
him stood “in loco parentis,” and offered that they were “residents . . . at
165
the declaration of independence.” Smith proclaimed that
the declaration of independence affected him as much, though at Geneva, as it did those in Carolina; his happiness, that of his dearest connexions, his property, were deeply interested in it: his fate was so closely
connected with that of Carolina, that any revolution in Carolina was a
revolution of him. Though a minor, as soon as he heard of the inde166
pendence of America, he considered himself an American citizen.

According to this strand of volitional allegiance, no election was necessary; citizenship was imposed by virtue of the Declaration.
Ramsay, the challenger, countered that the state “could not confer citizenship on Americans who were absent when independence
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id.
Id.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
Id. at 29.
Id.
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was declared . . . and anterior to their returning and joining their
167
Ramsay discountry under its new and independent Government.”
puted that birth in the United States before the Revolution conferred
citizenship, as those “who have neither done nor hazarded anything
for our independence” should not be allowed to claim citizenship
merely “from the circumstance of their having been born in this coun168
try.”
Ramsay would have required some form of election, whereby
169
Smith affirmatively returned to the United States to assert his loyalties.
Representative James Madison weighed in on this issue, and delivered nearly four pages of remarks. He began by stating that “from a
consideration of the principles established by the revolution, the conclusion I have drawn is, that Mr. Smith was, on the declaration of in170
dependence, a citizen of the United States.” Madison sought to rely
on the “laws and constitution of South Carolina” and to be “guided by
171
principles of a general nature.”
Madison reasoned from an “established maxim” that the place of birth is “the most certain criterion” of
172
citizenship, and this rule “applies in the United States.”
Madison noted that there are two allegiances that a citizen owes:
“the primary allegiance which we owe to that particular society of
which we are members, and the secondary allegiance we owe to the
173
sovereign established by that society.” While the latter is ephemeral,
the former is fixed. What happened “when the dissolution of [the allegiance of the American people] took place by the declaration of in174
dependence?”
The “primary allegiance” was retained, and owed to
the “new community” based on the “community in which [the citizen]
175
was born.”
If a person was born in the colony of South Carolina, following July 4, 1776, the primary allegiance was now owed to the newly formed
state of South Carolina. However, a citizen was “absolved from the

167

Id. at 32. These arguments concerning citizenship for those outside the United
States during the time of the Declaration of Independence closely track Ramsay’s position in A Dissertation on the Manner of Acquiring the Character and Privileges of a Citizen of
the United States. See generally RAMSAY, supra note 1.
168
CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, 1789–1834, supra note 6, at 32.
169
Id. at 31.
170
Id. at 32.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 33.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
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secondary allegiance he had owed to the British sovereign.”
son noted that

121
176

Madi-

[w]hen that society separated from Great Britain, [Smith] was bound by
that act, and his allegiance transferred to that society, or the sovereign
which that society should set up . . . . Mr. Smith being, then, at the declaration of independence, a minor, but being a member of that particular
society, he became, in my opinion, bound by the decision of the society,
with respect to the question of independence and change of Govern177
ment.”

Smith, an antenatus, was entitled to citizenship upon the Declaration, in accordance with the laws of South Carolina, regardless of where he resided.
Several members disagreed with Madison. Representative Boudinot “expressed an apprehension” that “the natives of America who
had deserted their country’s cause during the late war” would be per178
mitted to serve in Congress.
Representative Jackson remarked that
America “at the time of the revolution, was not properly to be com179
pared to a people altering their mode or form of Government.” Ra180
ther, the “whole allegiance or compact [was] dissolved” and there
181
was a “total reversion to a state of nature.”
During this period of
limbo, those living in America “had no general or Federal govern182
ment, or form of constitution, and yet were in arms.”
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in Respublica v.
Chapman addresses this issue, and contends that the period of election
could begin following the establishment of a functional govern183
ment. When the naturalization act was passed in 1779, South Carolina had a functioning government. Even if South Carolina had been
in a veritable state of nature following the Declaration, by 1779 it had
already established a valid government.
After hearing the passionate speeches regarding Smith’s citizenship, the House found “upon mature consideration, that William
Smith had been seven years a citizen of the United States at the time

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 59 (Pa. 1781).
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184

of his election.”
The resolution passed thirty-six to one, and “Mr.
185
Smith was confirmed in his seat.”
While the Constitutional Convention narrowly rejected Gouverneur Morris’s position—reliance on state law as the basis for U.S. citizenship—the first Congress effectively adopted it by a nearly unanimous margin. Although the Continental Congress “did not naturalize
186
In
foreigners, it adopted resolutions obliging the states to do so.”
this sense, the central government delegated the power to the states,
and the first Congress’s vote in the Smith case reflects that principle.
As Madison remarked, “Mr. Smith was a citizen at the declaration
of independence, a citizen at the time of his election, and, conse187
quently, entitled to a seat in this Legislature.” If Smith was entitled
to a seat in the legislature, according to Article I, then he was a citizen
of the United States. Madison’s syllogism indicates that a person with
citizen status , according to the law of the state, at the time of the Declaration, became a citizen of the United States for purposes of the
Constitution—even though this choice of citizenship predated our
great charter by thirteen years.
C. Interpretation of Jay’s Treaty
The Supreme Court later adopted the Chapman view of citizenship
through election. In M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, the Court considered
whether Daniel Coxe was a citizen of the United States or a citizen of
188
Britain for purposes of a claim under the terms of Jay’s Treaty. If he
189
were British, his estate would be unable to inherit lands by descent.
Coxe, a resident of New Jersey, chose to fight for the king during the
190
Revolution, and considered himself a British subject.
Unlike Samuel Chapman, who fled from Pennsylvania before the establishment
184

CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, 1789–1834, supra note 6, at 37.
Id.
186
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 219. I will address the Continental Congress’s delegation of other powers in future works.
187
CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, 1789–1834, supra note 6, at 35.
188
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 280 (1805). Justice Cushing, writing for the Court, remarked in a preliminary footnote that “Chief Justice [Marshall] did not sit in this
cause, having formed a decided opinion on the principal question, while his interest
.
was concerned.” Id. at 280 n.<dagger>. Marshall’s recusal could have stemmed from
his advocacy in a British debt case. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 199 (1796)
(representing a Virginia debtor, John Marshall argued for the validity of a Virginia statute passed during the Revolution, which discharged debts to British subjects).
189
M’Ilvaine, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 280.
190
Id. at 282.
185
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191

of the government, Coxe resided in New Jersey after the establishment of its Constitution on July 2, 1776, and following the enactment
192
of its treason statute by the legislature on October 4, 1776.
At the
Supreme Court, Coxe’s estate argued that he was an American citizen,
contending that the New Jersey Constitution had established a new
193
society at independence, rendering all inhabitants citizens.
M’Ilvaine contested this claim, and argued that Coxe’s actions
showed that his allegiances were with Great Britain. Relying on Chapman, M’Ilvaine argued that Coxe exercised his right of expatriation by
194
aligning with Britain after a reasonable period to make his election.
Coxe contended that he had resided in New Jersey beyond a reasonable period of election, received protection from the state, and thus
195
owed allegiance.
Even though Coxe was attainted in 1778 for disloyalty, he was still a citizen, and an attainder could not serve as an
196
Coxe argued that in
impediment to recovery under Jay’s Treaty.
light of the penalties he received as a result of the attainder “resulting
from his civil relation to the commonwealth,” he should be entitled to
197
benefit from that relation.
Both attorneys “sustained the right to
elect citizenship as an inherent and necessary consequence of the
198
Revolution,” but only differed over the timing of the election.
The place of Coxe’s birth was not dispositive, as citizenship could
be modified based on the election, and was not perpetual or immuta199
ble—thus, this holding rejects the reasoning from Calvin’s Case.
Now . . . those residing at the time of the revolution in the territory separating itself from the parent country, are subject to the new government,
and become members of the new community, on the ground either of
tacit consent, evidenced by their abiding in such territory; or on the
200
principle that every individual is bound by the act of the majority.

The M’Ilvaine Court held that after the government was established and the treason statute was enacted, Coxe “became a member
of the new society, entitled to the protection of its government, and

191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 54 (Pa. 1781).
M’Ilvaine, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 282.
Id.
Id. at 283, 285.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id. at 300.
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 202.
M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 290 (1805).
Id. at 312 (emphasis omitted).
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201

bound to that government by the ties of allegiance.”
The treason
statute was “conclusive upon the point, that the legislature of that
state by the most unequivocal declarations, asserted its right to the allegiance of such of its citizens as had left the state, and had attempted
202
to return to their former allegiance.” The determination of U.S. citizenship under Jay’s Treaty “was left necessarily to depend upon the
laws of the respective states, who in their sovereign capacities had
203
acted authoritatively upon the subject.”
Accordingly, Coxe was not
an alien, and his estate was entitled to recover.
Chancellor James Kent considered the principles in M’Ilvaine v.
204
Justice
Coxe’s Lessee to be authoritative in his 1827 commentaries.
Story advanced those same principles in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s
Snug Harbor, where he argued in dissent that following the Revolution,
individuals had time to select their loyalties, and that the Treaty of
205
Paris constituted the cutoff date for the period of elections.
While these cases disagree on the duration of the period of election, they all indicate that the United States began with the Declaration, and the period of election concluded well before the Constitution was ratified in 1789. If one resided in the United States at the
time of Independence, and made an election within a reasonable time
after the establishment of a civil government, that person became a
“citizen of the United States.” Original citizenship was born.
CONCLUSION
The period from 1776 to 1789 did not constitute a constitutional
interregnum—some kind of legal black hole—that our laws disregard.
Rather, this period laid the theoretical and legal groundwork to create
the status of American citizenship, and directly affected the interpretation of our Constitution. This simple, yet previously unrecognized
conclusion provides new insights into our legal heritage and challenges the current state of our constitutional jurisprudence.
201

M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 8 U.S. (2 Cranch) 209, 212 (1808).
Id. at 212-13.
203
Id. at 215.
204
2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 33-35 (Leslie B. Adams, Jr.
ed., Legal Classics Library 1986) (1827).
205
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 159-60 (1830) (Story, J., dissenting). Justice Story’s dissent
centered not on principles of citizenship, but on interpreting the technicalities of the
will. His view was later adopted by the Court in Shanks v. DuPont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242,
247 (1830), which held that the Treaty of Paris had fixed “the state of things as it existed at that period.”
202
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The Declaration cannot be ignored. For over a century, the Supreme Court has held that while the Declaration “may not have the
force of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the
limits of right and duty . . . it is always safe to read the letter of the
206
Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.” Justice Scalia has written that “[t]he Declaration of Independence . . . is
207
not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts.” Justice
Elena Kagan reaffirmed this reasoning during her Supreme Court
confirmation hearings in an exchange with Senator Coburn, remark208
ing that the Declaration lacks the force of law. So does the Declaration of Independence have the force of law? Yes, at least with respect
to notions of “citizenship.” While this proposition may seem unimportant at first blush today—the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized American Citizenship in 1868—it shows that one of the canonical doctrines of the Supreme Court is misplaced.
A more complete understanding of the significance of the Declaration—and the laws that the Continental Congress and the states
passed “in pursuance of” and “under the Authority of” the Declara209
tion—sheds new light on the Constitution.
Like “citizenship of the
United States,” which is based on doctrines that emerged from our
Independence, other portions of our Constitution are premised on
powers and rights predating 1789—including a state’s reserved pow210
211
ers, a state’s sovereign immunity, the privileges or immunities of

206

Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards, 183 U.S. 79, 107 (1901).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208
See Senate Committee on the Judiciary Holds a Hearing on the Elena Kagan Nomination
WASHINGTONPOST.COM,
(2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/KAGANHEARINGSDAY3.pdf (“I think you should want me to
act on the basis of law, and—and that is what I have upheld to do, if I’m fortunate
enough to be . . . confirmed, is to act on the basis of law, which is the Constitutions
[sic] and the statutes of the United States.”).
209
The nature and scope of laws—in the words of the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI—passed “in pursuance of” and “under the Authority of” the Declaration of Independence, will be analyzed in future works.
210
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (“The Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may,
in a given instance, reserve power to the States.” (emphasis added)).
211
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 764 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The
American Colonies did not enjoy sovereign immunity, that being a privilege understood in English law to be reserved for the Crown alone . . . .”); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (“In determining the sense in which Georgia is a sovereign State, it
may be useful to turn our attention to the political situation we were in, prior to the Revolution, and to the political rights which emerged from the Revolution.” (emphasis added)).
207
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213

United States citizenship, preexisting enumerated rights, and the
214
In order to fully understand these
rights retained by the people.
doctrines, one needs to understand that they have existed since 1776.
The relevant history for originalist inquiries stretches back further
than we may have thought. Whether other provisions of our Constitution should be understood differently in light of original citizenship
will be explored in future works.
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